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SOLVING COMPLEX PROBLEMS: EXPLORATION 
AND CONTROL OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
Studying complex problem solving by means of computer-simulated scenarios 
has become one of the favorite themes of modem theorists in German-speaking 
countries who are concerned with the psychology of thinking. Following the 
pioneering work of Dietrich Ddmer (University of Bamberg, FRG) in the mid-
70s, many new scenarios have been developed and applied in correlational as 
well as in experimental studies (for a review see Funke. 1988). Instead of study­
ing problem-solving behavior in restricted situations (like the "Tower of Hanoi" 
or "Cannibals and Missionaries"; cf. Greeno, 1974; Jeffries, Poison, & Razran, 
1977), the new approach focuses on semantically rich domains that provide a 
touch of reality that was not inherent in the older research (see also Bhaskat & 
Simon, 1977). In the computer-administered scenario "LOHHAUSEN," for in­
stance, subjects have to take over the regentship of a little town (Dorncr, 
Kreuzig, Rcither. & Staudcl, 1983). fn other wort, subjects take over the rofe$ of 
a manager of a little shop (Putz-Osterioh, 1981), of an engineer in a developmen­
tal country (Reither. 1981), or of a pilot flying to the moon (Thalmaier. 1979). In 
general, the new approach deals with the exploration and control of complex and 
dynamic systems by human individuals 
This chapter is divided into four main pans. First, I give a working definition 
of what I mean by "complex problem solving" and suggest how complex tasks 
can be profitably analyzed and compared to each other across domains. Second. 1 
summarize recent research on complex problem solving, analyze the main 
streams of current research, and discuss the underlying principles and mecha-
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nisms uncovered so far. Also. 1 consider how people learn to solve complex 
problems and discuss expert-novice differences in complex problem solving. 
Third. I describe my own approach io studying complex problem solving in 
which it is conceptualized as a dynamic process of knowledge acquisition and of 
knowledge application. I briefly describe the so-called DYNAMIS project and 
the DYNAMIS shell for scenarios, and report the results of some studies within 
this framework. Finally. I give perspectives for future research. 
DEFINITION OF COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING 
I argue that complex problem solving can be understood by contrasting it with 
"simple." noncomplex problem solving in terms of the following, non-ortho-
gonal criteria: 
1. Availability of information about the problem, that is. transparency of the 
problem situation. 
2. Precision of goal definition, that is, whetheragoal is defined, and whether 
there are multiple goats, some of which may be contradictory. 
3. "Complexity" of the problem as defined by the number of variables, the 
degree of connectivity among the variables, and the type of functional 
relationship (linear vs. nonlinear). 
4. Stability properties of the problem, that is. time dependencies in the 
course of the problem-solving process ("Eigendynamik"). 
5. "Richness" of the problem's semantic embedding. Rich semantic embed-
dings often reduce the uncertainty to a large degree 
A complex problem-solving situation is one that can be characterized by the 
following features (with respect to the previously mentioned criteria): 
1. "Intxansparcncy": In complex problem-solving situations, only some vari-
ables lend themselves to direct observation. Often, only knowledge about 
"symptoms' is avaiiabic, from which one has to infer the underlying state. This 
is a case of intransparency. Other cases of intransparency arise if variables can be 
assessed in principle, but their huge number requires selection of a few relevant 
ones. 
2. "Polytely" (from the Greek words poly tetos - many goals): Frequently, 
complex problem-solving situations are characterized by the presence of not one. 
but multiple goals. Problems can arise when some of the goals arc contradictory 
(e.g.. the manager who wants to make a lot of money, but has to pay high wages 
in order to find good workers), and a reasonable trade-off is required. 
3. "Complexity of the situation": This feature concerns the number of identi-
fication and regulation processes involved. A complex problem-solving situation 
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is not only characterized by a large number of variables that have to be consid-
ered, but also by their complex connectivity partem, by the possibilities to 
control the system, and by the dynamic aspects of the system. The growing 
complexity of situational demands may conflict with the limited capacity of the 
problem solver. 
4. "Connectivity of variables": A high degree of connectivity describes a 
situation in which changes in one variable affect the status of many other, related 
variables. Complex problems often contain a high degree of connectivity, that is. 
it is very difficult to anticipate all possible consequences of a given situation 
5. "Dynamic developments": Complex problem-solving situations often 
change decrementally and worsen, forcing a problem solver to act immediately, 
under considerable time pressure. Also, spontaneous changes in the other direc-
tion are possible, causing less stress but making the situation less predictable 
6. "Time-delayed effects": Not every action shows immediate consequences. 
In complex problem-solving situations, effects often occur with time delay. This 
makes it necessary for the actor to wait patiently, in sharp contrast to the aforemen-
tioned situation, in which immediate action is required. 
The features outlined differ not only from those traditionally emphasized in 
research on problem solving and thinking, but also from those employed in 
conventional intelligence tests. They do. however, allow for a more precise 
characterization of complex problem situations than do more traditional classifi-
cations, like the classification into well-defined and ill-defined situations. For 
example. Duncker's (1935) "radiation problem," although useful in studying 
analogical transfer (e.g.. Gick & Holyoak. 1983). might not be classified as a 
complex problem according to the present classification scheme, because it lacks 
the feature of dynamic development as well as that of complexity. 
Complex problem solving has also been a topic io recent man-machine re-
search. With increasingly more automation and computerization, the operator of 
a complex technical system becomes a complex problem solver, rather than 
merely a controller (cf. Bainbridgc. 1987). Process control tasks are used in the 
laboratory or observed in the field to address questions of systems design and of 
optimal training procedures of system-relevant knowledge. Because this research 
comes more from the applied, engineering point of view, however, it will not be 
reported in detail in this paper (see. e.g.. Rasmusscn, Duncan. & Leplat. 1987). 
RECENT RESEARCH ON COMPLEX 
PROBLEM SOLVING 
In the following. I consider some of the research on complex problem solving 
that has been conducted over the past 15 years. Following this review. I summa-
rize: (a) me domain-specific and domain-general principles and mechanisms 
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underlying complex problem solving; (b) Ihe acquisition of complex problem 
solving; and (c) expert-novice differences in complex problem solving. 
Review of Studies on Complex Problem Solving 
Because Ihe research themes diverge and the domains that have been chosen are 
very heterogeneous, it is not easy to arrange the various studies in a systematic 
way. Even the simulation systems can only be compared superficially. For rea-
sons of simplicity, the systems are, in the following, grouped according to their 
number of variables, a criterion which is sometimes seen as an essential indicator 
of complexity. Because no objective general measure of complexity exists, the 
number-of-variables criterion is just an expedient for orienting purposes. In this 
section. I give a short description of the major systems used in empirical research 
(for a more elaborated review sec Funke. 1988). 
Systems With up to 10 Variables. Systems with up to 10 variables are the 
most commonly used ones. Despite the fact that only a small number of variables 
is utilized, the complexity of these systems should not be underestimated. Table 
6.1 gives an overview of the major systems in this category. 
A major advantage of small systems is that all information relevant to the 
problem-solving situation can be displayed on a single computer screen, thus 
allowing the subject directly to interact with the system- for the small systems, 
the equations are given if known to ihe author. Systems are discussed in alpha-
betical order. 
BLACK BOX. In Mackinnon and hearing's (1985) BLACK BOX. subjects 
are asked to control an abstract. fiTst-order feedback system for 75 trials. The 
behavior of the system can be described by a complicated formula (cf. Mackin-
non & Wearing, 1985, p. 165). The subject's task is to maintain the goal value of 
a single system variable by controlling a single input variable. No information 
about system characteristics is given. BLACK BOX is a transparent system (no 
hidden variables) that has a single goal variable. The connectivity function is 
complex. There is no time pressure. The system develops dynamically. Effects of 
time-delayed feedback can be manipulated experimentally. 
In an experimental study using BLACK BOX. Mackinnon and Wearing ma-
nipulated two factors: the value of the boundary function which amplified or 
attenuated. the input value, and the intensity of feedback, opcrahonah/cd via a 
short versus long "memory'* of past inputs. For the data of 32 subjects. Mackin-
non and Wearing found no significant effect of the amplification factor: Subjects 
were able to quickly adapt their inputs to different boundary parameters. In 
contrast, intensity of feedback did have a significant effect on subjects* problem-
solving behavior. Results showed significantly better system control for the 
longer memory of past inputs. The authors concluded that a systems-analytical 
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TABLE 6.1 
Overv i ew of Simulation Sys tems : S y s t e m s With up to 10 VariaDles 
Name ir v i y tJ i Reference 
Ri ACK BOX 2 Mackinnon & Wearing (1985) 
m i D -STORAGE DEPOT 6 Reichert & D o r n e r (1988) 
F rONONf lC S T S T C M 4 Bioaf lbwiv f'rtiGetaW. & 
8roadb«nt (1986) 
E C O S Y S T E M 6 Funke 11985) 
(^A^-ABSORBER 6 Hubner (1987) 
HAMI JHA8I a Gediga, SchGrtke, & Tucke (1983) 
INVENTORY PROBLEM 3 Kletter (1970) 
MINI-LAKE G O p w i s & Spada (1985) 
MOONI.ANDING 3 Thalmaier (1979) 
PORAEU a Preussler (1985) 
SIM002 10 Kluwe & Reimenn (1983) 
SINUS 6 Funke & Muller (198B) 
S U G A R FACTORY 4 Berry & Broadbent (1987) 
T R A N S P O R T A T I O N A Broadbeot (19771 
W O R L D 4 Eyferth et al. (1982) 
approach might be helpful in identifying the demands a problem-solving task 
makes upon the problem solver and might also make the comparison of different 
tasks and the ordered exploration of the range of possible tasks easier 
COLD-STORAGE DEPOT. In Reichert and Dorner's (19S8) system, 
COLD-STORAGE DEPOT, subjects have to control a cold-storage depot by 
means of a steering wheel (u) with which the temperature of the depot (r) can be 
changed according to The following formula which is unknown to the subject* 
(s = outside temperature and v - delay factor; sec Reichert. 1986): 
rtt) = r<t - I) + («<0 - rtt - l»*0.1 - q<t - 1), 
q(t> = (r(t - v) - u(t))*0.3. 
This simulation system is transparent, has a single goal, dynamic develop-
ment, time pressure, and. most importantly, time-delayed effects which require a 
careful control strategy. 
In one of the studies using the COLD-STORAGE DEPOT. 54 student subjects 
had the opportunity to perform 100 interventions. Subjects were fold that the 
automatic veering was defective arvi human control was necessary in order to 
prevent the food from being spoiled. The results of the study showed that only 
one-fifth of the subjects were able to run the depot successfully. The main 
difficulty for subjects was the time-delay of the nonlinear function relating sub-
jects' interventions and the system's responses; some subjects recognized this 
delay and planned their actions adequately, that is. ahead of time, whereas other 
students changed their interventions immediately after receiving feedback- In-
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terestingly. some of the "good" problem solvers were not able to verbalize the 
rules they were using, so effectively. Reichert and Domer developed what they 
called a "simulation of the simulation," that is. a psychological model that 
simulated the simulation game, which was able to produce a synthetic behavior 
almost indistinguishable from the behavior of real subjects. 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM. Broadbcnt. FiizGerald, and Broadbent's (1986) 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM modeled an imaginary country, in which subjects can 
raise or lower the levels of taxation (R) and of government expenditure (G) in 
order to control the rates of unemployment (U) and of inflation (I) according to 
the following formulas (cf. Broadbcnt et al.. 1986. p. 41): 
U(t + I) = 12.8 - ((I - R)*(G + 7650)/730>. 
Kl + I) " KOM-45 - 0.15*U(t))-
Broadbent et al. argued that their findings demonstrate a dissociation between 
verbal reports and actions. I return to this topic later when related work of the 
Broadbcnt group (SUGAR FACTORY. TRANSPORTATION) will be presented. 
ECOSYSTEM. to ECOSYSTEM (Funfce. 19851 subjects arc asked (o con-
trol the amounts of insects (Yl>. leaves (Y2), and water pollution (Y3) in an 
ecosystem through the manipulation of poison (XI). vermin eaters (X2). and 
fertilizer (X3). according to the following system structure: 
Yl(t + 1) = 0.9*Yl(f) + 1.0*X2(t). 
Y2(t + 1) = 1.0*Y2(t) + 10.0*X3(t). 
Y3(t + 1) = l.O'Yl(t) - 0.1*Xl(t). 
ECOSYSTEM is a transparent, polytclic, complex, and dynamic system, in 
which lime delay and connectivity can be manipulated as experimental variables. 
The system simulates a total of five trials, each consisting of seven cycles. In 
the first four trials, subjects are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the 
system by actively exploring the system ("knowledge-acquisition phase"). In the 
last trial ("knowledge-application phase"), in contrast, subjects are asked to 
actively steer the system toward achieving a given goal state. Funkc found that 
two critical system attributes, namely, the "connectivity of the variables" and the 
"degree of tune delay/* had a large effect on subjects' quality of the knowledge 
representation (a subject's diagnosed "mental model" of the system) as well as 
on the degree to which the goal was achieved, although the effects of time delay 
appeared to be weaker than the effects of connectivity. In a similar study. Fritz 
and Funke (1988) demonstrated differences between pupils with minimal cere-
bral dysfunction and matched controls with respect to discriminatory and integra-
tional abilities in the process of hypothesis development and hypothesis testing. 
GAS-ABSORBER. Hubner (1987) simulates a GAS-ABSORBER with one 
input variable (u) and three states (x): 
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x(t + 1) = 
0.365 0.219 0.066 
0.186 0.421 0.219 
0.048 0.186 0.365 
F 0.0I91 
x(l) + 0.100 u(t) 
. 0.389 J 
The GAS-ABSORBER is a transparent, dynamic, complexly interconnected 
system with dynamic and time-delayed effects. The system's structure is. at a 
formal level, precisely defined and analyzed (see also Hiibner. 1989). 
In a study by Hubner (1987). two different learning conditions produced no 
differences with respect to the quality of control (measured as distance from a 
given objective point). However, distance to the goal at the beginning of the 
intervention phase proved to be very important: If the goal coufd be achieved in 
two steps, less input error was made than if the goal could be achieved in three 
steps. These results arc consistent with those obtained in manual tracking studies 
(see Bosser. 1983). 
HAMVRABI. HAMURAB1 is the name of the absolute ruler of the agrarian 
state of "Summaria." In Gediga, Schottke. and Hicke's < 1983) system, subjects 
have the task of keeping alive as much of the population of Summaria as possible 
by using four manipulations: purchasing and setting arable acreage, deciding the 
area to be sown with com. and determining the quantity of food required by each 
member of the community. Subjects ran through two trials, each simulating a 
time period of 30 years. The system partly depends on randomly varying vari-
ables. Gediga ct al. claim to have demonstrated that, on the one hand, problem 
situations with an exponential change over time were mastered by only a few 
subjects; on the other hand, the hypotheses of many subjects were in accordance 
with the complex problem situation and led to better performance. 
HAMURAB! is an intransparent, polytclic. complex system with dynamic 
components. Because of the random effects, it is not easy to determine the pure 
effects of subject interventions. 
INVENTORY PROBLEM. Kleiier (1970) uses a situation in which a retailer 
stocks a product which spoils if it is not sold by the end of a certain period of 
time. For every unit sold, the amount won increases; the units not sold decrease 
the amount won. The formula combining the input supply (A) with the output of 
the demand (Z) and a random component (e) under an "optimism condition" is 
as follows: 
Z<1 + 1) = 0.25*(A(t) - Ztt)) + Z<0 + c. 
Under the "pessimism condition." a weight of -0 .25 instead of 0.25 is used. 
The system is transparent, has a single goal, is low on complexity and connec-
tivity, but shows dynamic developments A random component makes subjects* 
performances mote difficult to interpret. 
For the "optimism condition." Kleiter found thai the demand for the product 
increased when a higher amount fhan the last one was stocked.- for the "pessimism 
condition." it was the other way around. The results of 40 subjects working with 
this system for a maximum of 50 trials demonstrated that only 2 subjects in each 
condition were able to accumulate a win whereas 6 subjects in the optimism and 12 
in the pessimism condition did not even reach the minimum win. 
MINI LAKE. The ecosystem MINI LAKE (Opwis & Spada. 1985) is a 
biological population model (with isolated as well as integrated parts) that is 
transparent, complex, and interconnected, has multiple goals, dynamic develop-
ment, and no time-delayed effects. Subjects managing the system are asked to 
infer the conditions of change that operate in the system to make predictions 
about future states. Subjects arc given precisely designated objectives and are 
asked to take adequate action. They can change the amount of phosphate fertil-
izer <u 1) and fish biomass (u2) to control for two kinds of phytoplankton (x I, x2) 
and zooplankton (x3. x4), according to the following matrices: 
x(t) = 
0 0 -0.244 -0.122 
0 0 -0.110 -0.220 
0.036 0.018 0 0 







Opwis and Spada argue that the nature of reliable and valid problem-solving 
indicators is problematic in most systems: with unrestricted access to the system, 
unknown solubility of the task, and ignorance of subjects' internal mental repre-
sentations of the system, the experimental examination of thought processes is 
virtually impossible. Opwis and Spada. therefore, use a research plan that allows 
control of these stated variables. A model based on subjects* individual knowl-
edge data was able accurately to predict approximately 80% of subjects' answers 
to questions about the system. 
MOONLANDING. Thalmaier (1979) uses the dynamic system MOON-
LANDING in which subjects have to control the landing maneuver of a space 
craft on the lunar surface. Thalmaier argues that the mathematical description of 
the problem type (e.g.. the simulated system) and an understanding of the sys-
tem's properties is a necessary prerequisite for understanding the behavior of 
experimental subjects. In his studies. Thalmaier found that 20 mathematics stu-
dent* who served as subjects were, indeed, able during a total of 20 practice 
landings, to recognize the dynamic aspects of the problem as well as its nonlinear 
development. Thalmaier concludes that subjects are not overtaxed from the 
beginning by nonlinear extrapolations. However, relative to an optimal steering 
strategy, subjects' difficulties in exploring and understanding the system were 
paramount. The successive recognition of the structure of the system through an 
input-output analysis had to occur first. 
Empirical findings concerning this paradigm also come from a study by Funke 
and Hussy (1984), who presented the MOONLANDING task in two different 
domains, in its original domain and as a similarly structured COOKING prob-
lem. Funke and Hussy predicted that experience with the two different reality 
domains would affect problem-solving performance. Twenty-four male and 
female subjects (assumed to be experts in the domains of MOONLANDING or 
COOKING because of sex-specific socialization) were used. The results, how-
ever, did not confirm the hypotheses. The main effects of the experimental 
conditions "domain" and "previous experience" on the dependent variable 
"quality of problem solving" were weak, and the expected interaction did not 
materialize. Statistical arguments did not allow an expanded interpretation of this 
finding. 
In a similar study with the modified target-approach paradigm. Hussy and 
Granzow (1987; Hussy, 1989) showed that problem-solving quality (measured as 
distance to a target state) decreased as a function of the increasing number of 
variables as well as of nonlinear interweaving functions, and of lower problem 
transparency. Hussy and Granzow found a significant correlation between test 
intelligence and problem-solving quality—but only under transparent conditions 
with few variables, which seems to support earlier findings reported by Putz-
Osterloh (1981). 
MOONLANDING is low on complexity but contains dynamic components. 
Experimental manipulation of domain effects, of complexity, and of transparency 
effects demonstrate the usefulness of this scenario in analyzing different influ-
ences on problem-solving behavior. 
PORAEU. PORAEU (Preussler. 1985) is a small nonlinear predator-prey 
model in which subjects have to anticipate the number of robbers and swags in a 
simulated ecosystem at each of the 35 discrete time points. 
In a prediction experiment. Preussler crossed three semantic conditions (help-
ful: the growth of the robbers was bad for humans; hindering: growth of robbers 
was good for humans; or neutral: an abstract version of the system without 
semantic labels), two prognosis conditions (only robber values had to be pre-
dicted vs. the prediction of robber and swag values was requested), and two 
presentation forms (number of robbers and swags with or without graphical 
displays). Subjects did not receive any information about system variables and 
the connectivity structure- Because the author used more than 20 dependent 
variables in mis experiment and tested more than 30 different hypotheses, it is 
difficult to summarize the results of this work in a few words. The main effects of 
the three factors on the predictive behavior were all nonsignificant; individual 
interactions, however, showed more distinct effects. Based upon an additional 
examination of response effects, the author concluded that individuals are not 
able to make predictions concerning exponential development trends. Interest-
ingly, under conditions of graphical feedback, subjects approximated nonlinear 
developments by linear functions. Introducing graphical feedback by showing 
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the growth functions improved the qualify of predictions, especially at later 
points in simulation time. 
PORAEU is not a very complex system, but realizes a nonlinear dynamic 
development thai is difficult for subjects to handle despite its traasparency and 
the fact that only a single goal has to be controlled. 
SIM002. Stimulated by a critical review of the studies on complex problem 
solving. Kluwc and Reimann (1983) derived an abstract system called S1M002. 
Kluwe and Reimann were less interested in pursuing the aim of simulating 
reality, rather, they wanted to develop systems that could be fit to many experi-
mental inquiries. A more detailed description is given in the next section for the 
similar system, SIMOOX. 
SINUS, Funke and Muller (1988) were concerned with the effects of differ-
ent demands of activity on the handling of an unknown dynamic system called 
SINUS. The system consists of living creatures from a distant planet called 
SINUS. The dependent variables arc given the nonsense names. "Ga-seln" (Yl). 
"Schmorkcn" (Y2). and "Sisen" (Y3); the independent variables are called 
-OJscbeD" (XJ), "Mukero" (X2), and "Raskeln" (X3). The system has the 
following structure: 
Yl(t + 1) = 10.0*Xl(t) + 1.0-YKt). 
Y2(t + 1) = 3.0*X3(t) + 1.0*Y2(t) + 0.2*Y3(t). 
Y3(t + 1) = 2.0*X2(t) -v 0.5'X3(t) + 0.9*Y3<t). 
The task of the subjects is to explore the system and to control the dependent 
variables with respect to given goal slates. 
In their study, Funke and Muller manipulated (a) the possibility to actively or 
passively explore the system; and (b) whether the next system state had to be 
predicted or not. The amount of system knowledge subjects had acquired and the 
quality of problem solving served as dependent variables. Funke and Muller 
expected (a) the "interveners" to be superior to the pure "observers" with regard 
to amount of knowledge as well as to efficient operations; and )b) the "predic-
tors" to accumulate more knowledge than the "nonpredictors." Subjects were 32 
coffege students. Pafh-artaJytiear evaluation of the data supported the expecta-
tions only partially: "interveners" were, indeed, better in dealing with the sys-
tem, but seemed to know less than "observers" (cf. the similar dissociations 
reported by Broadbent et al., 1986; Putz-Osterloh. 1987). "Predictors" were 
more knowledgeable than "nonpredictors." but only in a special mode. Knowl-
edge about the system was generally a good* predictor of operating performance. 
Interestingly, there was a negative relation between the duration of the experi-
ment and the quality of performance Detailed analyses of so-called "experimen-
tal twins"—pairs of subjects who dealt with the same system situations—indi-
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cated high intcrindividual variability, thus showing the relevance of person-
specific ways of data-evaluation. 
SINUS is a transparent, complex, interconnected, dynamic system with multi-
ple goals and no lime delays. It is an ideal instrument for experimental manipula-
tion of system attributes. 
SUGAR FACTORY. In Berry and Broadbenfs SUGAR FACTORY (1984). 
subjects are asked to manage a small sugar-production factory in order to reach 
and maintain a given target production level. The size of the work force IW) can 
be varied in 12 discrete steps, yielding a level of production (P> according to the 
formula: 
P(t + I) = 2*W(t) - Pfj). 
A second, mathematically equivalent task called PERSONAL INTERACTION 
used the same structure, but now the subject could choose between 12 styles of 
behavior (very rude. rude, very cool, cool loving) in order to produce and 
maintain a target behavior in a fictitious person called Clegg. After two sets of 30 
trials, results of a posttask questionnaire were correlated with control perfor-
mance, yielding nonsignificant coefficients of about -0 .50 (Exp, 1). 
In a later study, the SUGAR FACTORY simulation was combined with the 
PERSONAL INTERACTION task (Berry & Broadbent. 1987; Marcscaux. Luc. 
& Kamas, 1989) to make relationships more or less salient. The input variables 
were now the number of employed workers (W; 1-12) and the behavior toward 
the union chief (B; 1-10); the variables to be controlled were the level of sugar 
output (P; I-211 and the behavior of the union chief (G; 1-10), according to the 
formulas: 
P(t + 1) = 1.8*W(t) - 0.45*B(t>. 
G(t + 11 = 0.8-Blt) + 0.45*W<t). 
Results with this system illustrated the role of salience of relationships: No 
explicit knowledge about nonsalicnt relationships was acquired even when the 
system was handled very well. 
TRANSPORTATION. In this system, first used by Broadbent i)9?7>, sub-
jects have to control the bus load (L) and vacant parking spaces (VS) in a 
fictitious city parking lot by manipulating the time intervals between bus arrivals 
(T) and the amount charged for use of the lot (F). The formulas are: 
U l + 1) = 200*T(t) + 80*F(t). 
VS(t + I) = 4.5'F(t) - 2*T(t). 
As in earlier mentioned studies. Broadbent (1977) reported a dissociation 
between the verbal .statements of the subjects and their actual ability to control 
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the system. I discuss this phenomenon later in (he context of development of 
knowledge. 
SUGAR FACTORY. PERSONAL INTERACTION TASK, and TRANSPOR-
TATION arc all systems at the lower end of the complexity scale. They have no 
time delays, no intransparencies, no dynamic developments, and represent a 
situation with a single respectively a double goal. One might ask, therefore, if 
these systems would really represent complex problems. 
WORLD. Eyfeith. Hoffmann-Plato. Muchowski. Otrcmba. Rossbach. 
Spiess. & Widowski (1982) examine the coping possibilities—the "genesis of 
handling competence"—in a novel situation. WORLD exists as a series of 
pictures on a screen, upon which a few objects can carry out computer-controlled 
maneuvers and can move or interact with each other according to a set of fixed 
rules. The observer can use the keyboard to interrupt maneuvers and to become 
actively involved. The task is to understand the system rules and to manipulate the 
objects toward achieving a certain purpose. Four numbered squares move on the 
screen in various ways, changing after collisions. The observer can (a) vary the 
speed with which the squares move over the screen; (b) change the squares' 
directions of movement; and (c) stop the system. WORLD is a single-rule system, 
with dynamic development, no time delays, and a single goal. 
The results of an exploratory study (Eyferth et at.. 1982) indicated that sub-
jects gradually construct a system representation and connect it to existing 
schemata. 
Systems With up to 100 Variables. Table 6.2 shows the systems that belong 
to this category. 
DAGU. DAGU (Reither. 1981) simulates the climatic, ecological, and eth-
nic situation of a fictional African developing area. Subjects' goals are to create 
better living conditions for the people of DAGU and to increase the population, 
but to prevent overpopulation. Seven operational areas (i.e.. with the possibility 
for interventions) arc used: food, animal fodder, birth control, medical supply, 
preventive actions against tse-tse flies, set-up of irrigation projects, and sale of 
produce. The results of Rcither's research on DAGU are reported later in the 
section on expert-novice differences. 
DAGU as well as the following DORI and EPIDEMIC systems can be classi-
fied as a highly interconnected, complex, dynamic, and intransparcnt system 
with multiple goals. The DORI and EPIDEMIC system are offsprings of the 
DAGU program and their features are very similar to DAGU's. 
DORI. DORI simulates the living conditions of a nomad tribe in the Sahel 
region, whose livelihood depends on cattle rearing. Hesse (1982) compares a 
semantic version of DORI to a structurally identical, nonsemanttc version in 
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TABLE 6.2 
O v e r v i e w of Simulation S y s t e m s : S y s t e m s With up to 100 Variables 
Name # of Variables neicicnCS 
D A G U 12 Reiiher (1981) 
DORI 12 Hesse 11982) 
EPIDEMIC 13 Hesse, S p i e s ft IQer 11383) 
F A C T O R Y >20 X - 1 1 1 r * J 1 1 U 1 1 *J / I 
FIRE FIGHTING >10 Brehmer (1987) 
MEDICAL DECISION > 1 0 
M O R O 49 S t rohschne ider ( l986) 
SIMOOX 15 Kluwe. Misiak. Ringelband. & 
Haider (1986) 
T A I L O R S H O P 2 4 Puu-Oster loh (1981) 
T A N A L A N D 5 4 Dorner 8i Reiiher (1978) 
TANK S Y S T E M 14 Moray . Loois teen, & Pajak (1986) 
which the variables were designated by Latin letters. In addition. Hesse crossed 
the semantic factor with a factor transparency, whose two levels were the pres-
ence or absence of a graphical display of the connections between the variables. 
Hesse found that notes were more heavily consulted in the abstract, nonsemantic 
conditions, but that subjects in the semantic group asked more pointed questions 
and organized their actions better. In general, the observed differences between 
good and poor problem solvers suggested a difference in strategy that was related 
to the content area. In the abstract condition, there was a positive relation 
between intelligence test scores and problem-solving quality. This result is in line 
with previously observed correlations between transparency and IQ in a study by 
Putz-Osterloh (1981). 
EPIDEMIC. EPIDEMIC is a system that is very similar to DORI. EPI-
DEMIC, however, uses a different content area and also new individual connec-
tions Subjects are asked to take charge of the health authority of a small town in 
the aftermath of an epidemic disaster (Hesse. Spies. & Lilcr. 1983; the system 
variables and equations as well as the similarities to the DORI system are fully 
described in Spies & Hesse. 1987). Their decisions are aimed at reducing the 
number of illnesses. Subjects have a choice among seven possible interventions. 
EPIDEMIC S main concern is the effect of persona) distress, which is realized by 
simulating two kinds of epidemics, each of which is presented to different subject 
groups. Whereas a reduced level of distress is supposedly induced by a simulated 
influenza epidemic, a higher level of distress is induced by a dangerous smallpox 
epidemic. In both cases, the same structural equations are used, only the seman-
tic labels of the variables are changed. The findings of the experiment point out 
the effectiveness of the variable semantic content upon problem-solving quality; 
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the highly distressed students obtained higher quality values, worked harder, 
took more effective actions, and recognized effective measures more readily. 
FACTORY. Zimolong s (1987) FACTORY is a real-time, interactive, com-
puter-simulation program that simulates a manufacturing system containing up to 
seven machine stations. The spatial design of the machine places, the pathway of 
the material handling system through the production unit, and the launching 
point of the parts arc arbitrarily adjustable. The characteristics of the individual 
machine stations can be changed in different ways. The screen image (showing 
the machines and their actual state) is updated every second; the subjects can 
check and maintain the state of the machinery in order to prevent breakdown of 
the factory. FACTORY is a highly dynamic and real-time environment, with 
many variables, time delay effects, and partial intransparcney. 
Empirical work by Zimolong (1987) showed that, after one hour of practice 
with the simulation system, risk-taking behavior (measured as time to expected 
tool wear failure) under conditions of complete human control was less devel-
oped than under conditions of limited control. Zimolong concluded from these 
results that the job design in a flexible manufacturing system should care for an 
active operator instead of automated conditions. 
FIRE FIGHTING. Brehmer (1987) is interested in the mental models prob-
lem solvers develop on the basis of direct, interactive experience with a system. 
Brehmer describes a "dynamic decision problem" as one in which (a) a series of 
interdependent decisions is required to reach the goal; (b) the environment 
changes over time; and (c) the decisions change the state of the world, thus 
creating new decision problems. Based on a general computer program for 
simulating dynamic decision problems called DESSY (Dynamic Environmental 
Simulation System), the FIRE FIGHTING scenario simulates "the decision 
problems facing a fire chief who obtains information about forest fires from a 
reconnaissance plane" (p. 115). The information is displayed on a VDU. and the 
subject has command over eight fire-fighting units. The goal is to prevent the fire 
from reaching the base as well as minimizing the area that is burned down. FIRE 
FIGHTING is a complex, dynamic system with multiple goals and with time 
delayed effects. 
Brehmer's studies (see also Brehmer & Allard. 1991) demonstrated that com-
plexity (measured in number and efficiency of fire fighting units) had "little or no 
effect on performance, so long as the total efficiency of the units as a whole is 
kept constant" (p. 118). In contrast, delay of even minimal feedback had disas-
trous effects. Brehmer concluded that subjects do not manage to form any truly 
predictive model of the system, but. instead, base their reactions only on direct 
feedback. 
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MEDICAL DECISION TASK. Kleinmuntz and Kieinmuntz (1981) use a 
simulated medical decision task environment that is based on probabilistic rela-
tions between symptoms, diseases, and treatments. Within this scenario, a per-
son (the doctor) is confronted with an ill patient complaining of three symptoms 
and suffering from one out of five possible diseases. The doctor can. at each 
point in time, request a test for any of 30 symptoms; in addition, she can choose 
among 12 different treatments. The task is dynamic insofar as the disease gener-
ally causes the patient to get progressively closer to death from trial to trial 
(linear trend), because each test for a symptom has a detrimental effect, and 
because the same treatments can have vastly different effectivenesses depending 
upon the disease of the patient. Comparing the strategies of (a) expected utility, 
(b) heuristic decision, and <c) generate-aod-test. Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz 
found strategy (a) to be best, (b) slightly worse, and (c) less good. Data from 
human subjects were not reported. 
MEDICAL DECISION TASK has conflicting goals and dynamic compo-
nents, but is not very complex and interconnected. 
MORO. Slrohschneider (1986). Putz-Osiertoh 0987). Putz-Ostertoh & 
Lemme (1987). and Staudel (1987) use the scenario MORO, which simulates the 
situation of a small nomad tribe in the southern Sahara. MORO is a polytclic, 
intransparent system with highly interconnected and dynamic variables, which 
partly show time-delayed effects. 
In one of the studies using MORO. Strohschneider (1986) deals with the 
question of just how far this research instrument can be used to gather stable data 
and what evidence for the external validity of these data can be found. Concern-
ing test-retest stability, Slrohschneider concluded that behavioral indices (e.g.. 
the number of questions posed) show a higher reliability than measures of the 
system's condition (e.g.. the number of starving people). From an exhaustive 
debriefing of the subjects, Strohschneider concluded that subjects perceive the 
demands on their problem-solving ability as valid in the simulated scenario as in 
everyday complex problem solving. 
SIM00X. SIMO0X is a descendant of SIM002. which therefore will be de-
scribed first. The system S1M002 consists of 10 system variables, whose rela-
tions are fixed in a first-order parameter matrix. The system states are displayed 
in the form of a histogram on the monitor of a personal computer, and the 
subjects can change as many of the variables as they want to at any given time, 
The goal of the problem solver is to reach a nominal value displayed on the 
screen; the difference between achieved state and goal determines the quality 
measure. 
A more recent version of the system SIM002 is the system SIM00X. in which 
the number of variables have been increased to 15 and the system variables have 
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been arranged into groups. Unresiricied access to the system is followed by a 
stcp-by-step confining of the status display. At uneven intervals, subjects have to 
reproduce the previous system states or to anticipate the next ones. 
The SIMOOX systems are complex, interrelated, dynamic systems with partial 
intransparency and multiple goals. System characteristics can easily be changed 
for experimental purposes. 
A central assumption of the work using SIM002 and SIMOOX concerns the 
postulate of various stales of construction of mental models, which are identified 
in individual studies of longer duration. The authors sec the elapsing complex 
learning processes under the perspective of "chunk" construction. Because an 
ideal intervention into the system with respect to the stated aim can be designated 
at any time (because of the system construction), the process of learning can be 
described accurately. An increase in proficiency is coupled with a gain in time, 
which (as with chunk building) is open to large individual differences. At the end 
of a long steering period (200 simulation tacts per subject), the subjects have a 
verbalizable system knowledge with respect to the connections of the variables as 
well as to the specific qualities of individual variables. 
TA1LORSHOP. TAILORSHOP(Putz-Ostcrloh, 1981; see also Putz-Osterloh 
& Lucr. 1981; the systems equations are fully published in Hinke, 1983) is a 
miniature system in which subjects take over the management of a tailor shop: By 
purchasing raw materials and modifying the production capacity in terms of 
workers and machines used, shirts are to be produced and to be sold at a profit. The 
goal is to describe and examine the sine qua nons of complex problem solving and 
of intelligence test tasks, and which problem-solving processes can be used to 
surmount these requirements. In addition, complex problems should be more 
strongly equated with everyday problem situations than intelligence tests presently 
arc. In a complex problem, as opposed to an IQ-test item, the construction and 
derivation of problem-solving objectives requires a choice of actions leading to the 
achievement of the goals and the active search for information about relevant 
system variables. TA1LORSHOP is an intransparent. complex, dynamic, inter-
connected system with imprecise goals and time-delayed effects, 
A study by Putt-Osterloh and Luer (1981) tested the hypothesis that test-
intelligence and problem-solving performance are related through a comparison 
of a transparent with a nontransparent condition (N = 70 student subjects). The 
two experimental conditions were the presence or absence of an illustration, 
which presented the connections between the system variables. Only under the 
transparent condition did the authors find a statistically significant correlation 
between problem-solving performance and IQ. They interpreted this result as a 
criticism of common intelligence tests in which transparency is generally high. 
They argued that "real" problems are rather intransparent and highly compli-
cated and therefore demand behavior that cannot be measured by intelligence 
tests. 
6. S O L V I N G COMPLEX PROBLEMS 2 0 1 
TAN ALAND. The TAN ALAND system (Domcr & Rcither. 1978) was one 
of the earliest simulation studies published. The ecosystem of an African land-
scape with various flora and fauna as well as human groups, the "Tupis" and 
"Moras." who live by cattle and sheep farming, is simulated. The 50 or more 
system variables arc connected through a complicated process of "positive and 
negative feedback." Subjects are to assume the role of a technical agronomy 
advisor to improve the living conditions of the native population. The system is 
very difficult to handle. As Domcr and Rcither have shown, almost no subject is 
able to succeed in this task. The observed failures mirror deficits of a more 
general nature. It appeared that the subjects did not possess enough cognitive 
ability to be able to cope with complex systems. The failure of "linear thinking" 
was proposed. In the realized systems, which were described in terms of such 
features as dynamics, complexity, connectivity, and opaqueness, thinking in the 
form of causal networks should be considered. 
TANK SYSTEM. Interested in the acquisition of process control skills. Mor-
ay, Lootsteen, and Pajak (1986) use a tank system consisting of four subsystems. 
Each subsystem consist* of one tank with input and output valves and a heater. 
Temperature and level of each tank are shown on a VDU in analog and digital 
form. The task is to control either one or all of the tanks with respect to given 
required set points for level, temperature, and flow rate; the required points 
should be reached as rapidly as possible. Each of the 12 trials is run until these 
goal points are reached. TANK SYSTEM is an interconnected, transparent, 
complex system with multiple goals and dynamic development. 
Discussing the problems of data analysis, the authors concluded that it would 
make no sense to average individual data Rather, the data should be analyzed 
separately for each operator. Looking at the graphs of the system variables as a 
function of time, they concluded further that operators develop good "mental 
models" of the system. "One aspect of the more complex skill is. therefore, the 
discovery of causal relations and their use to develop control tactics" (p. 498). 
Starting with closed-loop control, good operators later developed almost perfect 
open-loop control. Switching from the control of one tank to the control of four 
tanks simultaneously, learning slowed down and interference effects occurred. 
Despite the enormous variety in sequences used to achieve the required goal, 
strategies emerged that were related to the development of the mental model 
"which represents the dynamics and causality of the system and leads to more 
efficient control" (p. 504). 
Systems with more than 100 variables. Only two systems (sec Table 6.3) 
that have more than 100 variables and were used in scientific research are known 
to this author. One of them—LOHHAUSEN—is the most prominent example of 
the new way of studying problem-solving processes. (For a short description of 
LOHHAUSEN in English language see Dorner. 1987.) 
T A B L E 6.3 
O v e r v i e w ot Simulation S y s t e m s : S y s t e m s With 
More Than 100 Variables 
Name # of Variables Reference 
E N E R G Y S U P P L Y >2000 Vent (19851 
L O H H A U S E N >2000 Dorner. Kreuzig, Reither. & Staudei 119831 
ENERGY SUPPLY. The "Energicvcrsorgung" (ENERGY SUPPLY) of pri-
vate households in the Federal Republic of Germany was simulated in a large-
scale system in which individual energy choice preferences were projected over 
time and space (Vent. 1985). The author was concerned with the effect of various 
presentation and feedback forms that stimulate certain ways of thinking (for 
instance, analytical or holistic thinking). In one condition, he presented the 
system's data numerically and in the other, graphically. The results supported the 
superiority of a visual-holistic way of thought over an analytic style of thought as 
measured by the quality of decisions. There have been no follow-up studies with 
this system. 
LOHHAUSEN. If TAN ALAND was the first scenario to study complex 
problem solving, then LOHHAUSEN was its expansion. The simulated reality 
domain (a small city called LOHHAUSEN) contains more than 2000 variables. 
Dorner. Kreuzig, Reither. and StaudeTs (1983) comprehensive monograph intro-
duced the five years of work on this unique study with the following sentences: 
The following report states the results of a relatively long-term psychological 
experiment. We tried to find out something about the conditions and forms of 
actions in ambiguous and complex situations. For this we systematically observed 
48 subjects over a relatively long period and processed the manifold results of these 
observations, (p. 13) 
LOHHAUSEN. originally the name of the simulated town, has since become 
the name of a research program: a deepening of cognitive psychology through 
new paradigms of problem-solving research; paradigms that, in contrast to the 
traditional types of problems such as mind games or mental exercises, contain the 
characteristics of complexity and uncertainty. Subjects, who took over the role of 
mayor of LOHHAUSEN. were instructed to "take care of the future prosperity of 
the town over the short and long term." that is. over a simulated 10-year period. 
Testing was done in eight two-hour sittings. Approximately 100,000 data points 
per subject resulted, from which the authors hoped to successfully separate the 
important from the trivial, and accidental from meaningful information. 
The analysis of the findings—with a few exceptions, such as case studies of 
selected experimental subjects—was based upon aggregated data. The authors 
first agglomerated the objective and subjective measures of problem-solving 
quality to a single "General Quality Criterion," which made it possible to split 
the total sample into two extreme groups (N = 12) of good and poor problem 
solvers. Results comparing the two groups showed that different variables in die 
LOHHAUSEN system (such as earnings of the industry, funds of the town, 
stocks of the bank, production and trade data, number of inhabitants, and rate of 
employment) developed more detrimentally when worked on by the poor prob-
lem solvers than by the good problem solvers. Even the "good problem solvers" 
were not what their designation suggested, however System experts (the experi-
menters) achieved even higher values on some of the variables. 
The behavioral effects were less interesting than the connected thought, plan-
ning, and decision processes: Besides formal characteristics (e.g., the frequency 
and consistency of decisions) and content biases (e.g., "financial situation of the 
watch factory") of the experimenters' "gross protocol," there were interesting 
references in the "think-aloud protocols" that the subjects were encouraged to 
produce. Subjects* problem-solving quality and their test intelligence were found 
not to be correlated. Neither Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) nor 
Cattell's Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFT) correlated substantially with the 
solution quality. Rather, what correlated significantly with problem-solving per-
formance was the experimenters' spontaneous judgment that a "subject makes an 
intelligent impression." 
Although the authors were right in pointing out the shortcomings of classical 
IQ-tests (e.g.. not taking information search into account), they themselves did 
not take a possible shortcoming of their own findings into account: the possible 
lack of reliability of their problem-solving measures It is known that intelligence 
tests, when used repeatedly, produce homogeneous results. Also, the sample 
limitations (students with a restricted range of IQ scores) should not have been 
ignored when the results were interpreted. 
Further findings of the LOHHAUSEN study were concerned with personality 
characteristics and their relation to solution quality. The construct of "self-
confidence" has to be given a special mention in this context; it had a strong 
positive relation to complex problem solving and was introduced to set off "the 
total failure of intelligence tests." Also, prior knowledge was not a significant 
predictor of success. 
The condensed theory of this comprehensive study contains a list of elemen-
tary information processing methods for dealing with complex problems such as. 
for example, component and dependence analysis as well as sub- and superor-
dination processes. The construction and pursuit of partial objectives by a subject 
is subsumed under an intention management model. Based upon the emotional 
embedding of cognitive processes (Domer. Reither. & Staudei. 1983). the intel-
lectual emergency reaction—a quick and general reaction of the cognitive sys-
tem to unspecified danger situations—can be brought into connection with the 
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actual competence of the actor. Self-confidence can be used as an indicator for 
heuristic competence, which refers to the ability "to be able to create adequate 
ways of dealing even with unknown situations" (Dorner. Reither, & Staudel. 
1983. p. **36; cf, Staudel. 1987) Central to the theory is the concept of control: 
Control competence guarantees action in uncertainty, and loss of control leads to 
the negative emotional consequences, which override problem-solving thought. 
LOHHAUSEN not only stands for a new field of research in cognitive psy-
chology; it is also an appeal against the prevalent "analytical procedure" in 
scientific endeavor. The examination of the highly complicated cognitive system 
of "mankind'"—following Ddmec—cannot be pursued using strictly experimen-
tal means because the isolation of a few chosen variables in a laboratory says 
little about the "normal" interplay of processes that are interactively embedded 
within other variables (see also Domer. 1989). The demand for an intensified 
"collecting of beetles and butterflies." that is. the exact description of the ob-
served phenomena, goes hand in hand with the search for an overlapping concep-
tual framework concerning the complete workings of the psychic system. (A first 
impression of this framework can be found in Ddrner. Schaub. Staudel. & 
Strohschncidcr. 1988). 
At the end of this section, the question has to be raised as to what sense it 
makes to permanently create new systems. It is surprising, for instance, thai no 
replication of the famous LOHHAUSEN study exists; in fact, many of the pre-
viously mentioned systems lack this basic scientific requirement. From this au-
thor's point of view, if new systems are. indeed, needed, existing systems should 
be modified, rather than new systems created, in order to fulfill certain experi-
mental requirements, If different systems are used in different studies, results can 
neither be compared nor heterogeneous conclusions clearly attributed to certain 
system attributes. What is missing, then, is a descriptive schema of systems that 
allows us directly to compare different systems with respect to such attributes as 
complexity, connectivity, transparency, etc. The following section offers a tax-
onomy of influence factors that might help to organize the different studies. 
Main Streams of Current Research 
Main streams of current research as revea/ed in the matcriaf reviewed center 
around the following three topics, which might serve as a taxonomy of possible 
influential determinants: (a) personal factors (poor vs. good problem solvers), 
(b) situational determinants of complex problem solving, and (c) system charac-
teristics. 
The role of personal factors can be differentiated in three ways: (a) cognitive 
abilities, (b) emotional and motivational factors. ic> personality characteristics in 
a broader sense. Concerning the cognitive abilities, one would probably expect 
intelligence (o play an important role in handling complex situations. "Whatever 
intelligence may be, reasoning and problem solving have traditionally been 
viewed as important subjects of it. Almost without regard to how intelligence has 
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been defined, reasoning and problem solving have been part of the definition" 
(Sternberg. 1982. p. 225). The empirical support for the effect of intelligence on 
the quality of complex problem solving is rather poor, however most empirical 
studies report either low or even rem correlations. Correlations tend to increase, 
however, when the problem-solving situation is made more similar to the intel-
ligence-test situation, that is. when the problem situation is made more trans-
parent. Also, a more differentiated diagnosis of intelligence reveals higher cor-
relations on subtest-lcvcl rather than on a global one (see Thomas. Hermann. & 
Jagcr. 1989; Hussy. 1989). 
Concerning emosional and motivational factors, one has to acknowledge that 
in the course of action, many situations develop that might evoke emotional 
reactions; for example, critical events that demonstrate a person's inability to 
cope with the given situation. There are presumably many feedback loops be-
tween "pure" cognitive processes and these evaluation processes; in case of 
luck, or of good interventions, they could be stabilizing; otherwise, one might 
expect a lot of disturbances stemming from the noncognitive area. Ddmer. 
Kreuzig. Reither. and Staudel (1983) reported an "intellectual emergency reac-
tion" for some of their subjects, a quick and general reaction of the cognitive 
system to unspecified danger situations. The effects of this reaction were (a) a 
general increase in activation, (b) an extemalization of behavior control (reduc-
tion of situation analysis and growing use of dogmatic principles), and (c) the 
activation of unspecific. precautionary' behavior. 
Personality characteristics in a broader sense seem to have a great influence 
primarily in the beginning stages and especially under conditions of intransparcn-
cy. In the.se cases, cognitive abilities and knowledge are less required than, for 
example, a stable personality that shows no overload due to the huge amount of 
uncertainty. One can imagine that people with high anxiety and/or low self-
confidence will tend to retreat from these situations. It is. thus, evident that a lot 
of nonintellectual abilities are necessary to cope with uncertain situations. These 
abilities are not problem-solving qualities themselves, but. rather, reflect the 
importance of individual differences due to different state and trait personality 
characteristics. 
The role of situational determinants is related to (a) the transparency of the 
situation, and <bl the concrete task demands with which a subject has to cope. 
As previously mentioned, the transparency of a situation depends on the 
degree to which a subject has direct access to system information. This factor can 
be manipulated easily by the experimenter. Putz-Osterlob (1981). for example, 
used a diagram that displayed the relations among the system variables: under a 
transparent condition, subjects could see this diagram; under intransparency, they 
could not. Degree of (in)transparency of system connections is not the only way 
of manipulating this variable, however. Another frequently used method consists 
of varying how subjects get the information they want: under transparent condi-
tions, subjects are shown all interesting variables on a VDU; the subject thus has 
direct access to the system. Under intransparency. the expenmenter is the medi-
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ator between system and subject; every time a subject wants some information 
(i.e.. about the actual values of a certain variable), he or she has to ask the 
experimenter who will gi%'e an answer if possible. 
Additional situational determinants are the concrete task demands subjects 
have to fulfill. Sometimes they have to control an (unknown) system right from 
the start, sometimes they are allowed to explore the system in a previous phase. 
Demands vary also with respect to goals: sometimes no goals are given at all (the 
finding of an adequate goal is part of the task), sometimes a few selected vari-
ables, and sometimes all variables, have to he controlled 
Brehmer (1989) conceptualizes the tasks of process control as "dynamic 
decision tasks"—in contrast to static or sequential decision tasks—with the 
following four characteristics: "(a) a scries of decisions are required; <b) these 
decisions are interdependent; (c) the decision problem changes, both autono-
mous/y and as a consequence of the decision mater's action; and (d) the deci-
sions are made in real time" (p. 144). Based on the assumption that the human 
decision-maker does not want to resolve discrete choice dilemmas, but. rather, 
attempts to achieve control. Brehmer (see also Brehmer Sc Allard. 1991) char-
acterizes dynamic decision tasks more precisely, differentiating between 
(a) complexity (in relation to control); (b) feedback quality (the problem of 
indicators); (c) feedback delay (which implies feedforward instead of feedback 
control); (d> possibilities for decentralization (i.e.. give control to local decision 
makers); (e) rate of change (controlling the economy of a country vs. flying a 
jet); and (f) the relation between the control process and the to-be-controlled 
process. 
Understanding the role of system characteristics requires a differentiation 
between (a) formal aspects and (b) aspects with regard to the contents. 
The formal aspects are related to the number of variables, their connectivity, 
the resulting stability of the system, the degree of time delays, and so on. Also, 
the distinction between time-continuous and time-discrete systems is useful as is 
that of linear versus nonlinear systems. Trie question of deterministic versus 
stochastic modeling of the domain has to be answered, too. 
The aspects with regard to content are not so easy to specify. Primarily, one is 
concerned with the semantic embedding of the system in question, but also with 
the relation between the actually implemented structure and the structure which is 
assumed by the subject because of previous knowledge. 
Principles and Mechanisms Underlying 
Complex Problem Solving 
It is not easy to list the principles and mechanisms that govern complex problem-
solving activity by a human operator. One may ask. in fact, if there are any 
special mechanisms and principles that are applied to complex problem-solving 
tasks, or if it is simply sufficient to look for the mechanisms applicable to the 
solving of simple problems. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have claimed: 
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"People rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce complex 
tasks to simpler judgmental operations." (p. 1124) The reason to look for special 
principles comes from the new demands that the complex control tasks require. 
As mentioned in the introduction, complex problems have unique features that 
they do not share with simple problems. Therefore, one has good reason to 
assume that special mechanisms are needed to deal with these features. 
On the other hand, there are also reasons to assume that a general model could 
be applied to this situation. Knaeuper and Rouse (1983). for example, suggest 
the application of the production-system formalism. They specify four tasks that 
an operator has to perform, (a) transition tasks (bringing the system into a certain 
state), (b) steady-state tuning, (c) detection and diagnosis of failures, and 
(d) compensation for failures. Therefore, they postulate, the operator needs 
knowledge about (a) how the system would evolve if left alone; (b) what effects 
the control actions would have; and <cl which of the four aoovemcntroned tasks is 
the appropriate one. 
For purposes of clarity. I first give a brief sketch of how—under ideal condi-
tions—structural knowledge about an unknown system can be acquired and 
used; then the development and use of strategic knowledge is described. The 
separate presentations should not be taken as suggesting that the two aspects can 
be seen as unconnected parts, however. 
The Development of Structural Knowledge. In the following, a normative 
stage model of structural knowledge acquisition is outlined for which empirical 
data have still to be delivered Yet. despite the missing empirical base, the model 
might serve as a useful frame of reference for discussing the principles and 
mechanisms of solving complex problems in terms of knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge application processes. 
Complex problem solving requires the development of structural knowledge, 
which describes the functional or causal relationships between variables. This 
explicit knowledge is the condensed result of a hypothesis-formation and hypoth-
esis-evaluation process. It can be assumed that this knowledge starts from simple 
observation of contingencies between subsequent system stales. At its first stage, 
such knowledge is restricted to the pure identification of a relation between at 
least two variables (relational knowledge). At the second stage, such observa-
tions lead to a more differentiated view that allows a statement about the sign of 
the relation (sign knowledge). At the third stage, finally, the precise influence 
factor can be specified (numencal knowledge). 
The three kinds of knowledge arc expected to be in a declarative format. The 
basic unit looks like the following quadruple: 
H,: = < V „ V 2 . C . B>. 
that is. a hypothesis at time t (H,) consists of four components; specifications of 
(a) a variable I (V,). (b) a variable 2 (V2), (c) a connectivity form(C), and(d)a 
degree of belief (B) in the hypothesis. For example, for a hypothesis on the 
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causal influence of "advertise" (V,) on "demand" <V2), the connectivity form 
(C) of a hypothesis could be "positive linear," the degree of belief (B) "high." 
One could argue that this conceptualization of a hypothesis is similar to a 
schema with four slots. If one knows the semantics of V, and V ; , for example, 
connectivity (C) and degree of belief (B) may be default values due to pnor 
experience. 
In addition to the explicit knowledge, implicit knowledge also emerges. In a 
series of studies. Berry and Broadbent (1984, 1987; cf. Broadbent & Aston. 
1978; Broadbent el al.. 1986) found evidence thai, despite low explicit task 
knowledge (as measured by a questionnaire), subjects were able to control small 
systems with good performance, These results are not without problems: Haider 
(1989), on the basis of a simulation study, argued that, for the control of these 
systems, complete explicit knowledge is not necessary. However, one has to 
accept the possibility that subjects acquire a lot of information above the degree 
that is usually assessed by diagnostic procedures. The results of a recent series of 
studies by Sanderson (1989) point to the same conclusion. Using the TRANS-
PORTATION system originally introduced by Broadbent et al. (1986). Sander-
son demonstrated association as well as dissociation effects between task perfor-
mance and verbalizable knowledge depending on amount of practice, kind of 
display, and cover story. Interestingly. Sanderson's results contradict the com-
mon thesis that, with growing practice, verbal task knowledge decreases (e.g.. 
Anderson. 1983). 
The Development of Strategic Knowledge. It is by far more complicated to 
describe how strategic knowledge develops in the course of action. In most 
cases, this is essentially a problem of application, and not of developing, the 
concepts. Like structural knowledge, the strategic procedures used by. and 
known to. a subject depend primarily on previous experience. Unlike sttucwial 
knowledge, however, it is not as easy to construct experimental conditions under 
which the influence of previous strategic knowledge is minimized. Some kind of 
"naive experimentation." the use of concepts like "isolated (or systematic) 
variation of conditions." "Eigendynamik," "side effects," etc.. are part of this 
strategic inventory which a subject possesses. 
Learning to Solve Complex Problems 
Learning to solve complex problems has two aspects. The first aspect concerns 
the improvement in handling a system over the course of repeated experiences 
(domain-specific learning). The second aspect concerns the potential transfer 
from one complex problem to another (domain-general learning). Generally, one 
is interested in improving complex problem-solving performance by some kind 
of training. 
One example of this approach is a training study by Strcufcrt. Nogami. 
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Swezey, Pogash. and Piasecki (1988). They used a design in which 56 subjects 
first had to work with one of two complex scenarios (cither as coordinator of a 
disaster control center or as governor of a developing country) for six hours. 
Then, a first group (17 of the participants) received extensive training on do-
main-general rules (especially on structural management styles) and on their 
concrete operationalization. A second group (7 persons) received only the specif-
ic training, and a third, control group (31 persons) received no training ai all. 
After that, all subjects had to work with the second system in order to assess 
training effects. As was expected, condition (a) yielded significant improvements 
in 8 out of 13 performance measures compared with only 4 improvements and 1 
impairment under condition (b) and 5 impairments without any improvement 
under the no-training condition. 
Many training methods for improving learning abilities exist (for a review see 
Deny & Murphy. 1986). including microcomponent training as well as meta-
stratcgy approaches. But one has to consider that training an executive control 
mechanism that would automatically assess and combine learning skills when-
ever needed can only gradually be developed and requires time. Dcrry and 
Murphy, therefore, concluded that. "The choice of which taxonomy to use and 
which learning skills to train is a matter of selecting what is appropriate for the 
student population, the training time allowed, and the type of learning material 
involved" (p. 32). With respect to complex problem solving, one might expect 
that a lot of time is needed for improving behavior. Hays and Singer (1989) give 
a good overview of problems and possible solutions in designing and evaluating 
training systems. 
Differences between Experts and Novices 
Differences between novices and experts in "normal" problem solving, were 
summarized by Mayer (1988). who stated "that experts and novices differ with 
respect to their tendency by using chunking in free recall, to use comprehensive 
plans in solving problems, and to classify problems based on their underlying 
solution requirements" (p. 572). 
For complex problem solving, too. the observed differences between novices 
and experts arc a relevant source for thconzing. 
Reither (1981), using the DAGU simulation system, compared the results of 
12 development-aid workers with 6 to 8 years of practical experience in third 
world countries with those of 12 subjects who were about to begin their first 
mission in developmental aid. Subjects working in groups of three had to create 
better living conditions for the people of Dagu and to increase their population 
smoothly. The results showed differences between novices and experts insofar as 
novices thought more in causal chains than in causal webs (i.e.. thinking mainly 
in terms of "straight-on" main effects instead of taking possible side effects into 
their deliberations), showed more thematic jumps, and made more "metastalc-
mcnts." The hallmark of expertise was experts' blind coping, thai is. the fact thai 
experts arrived at conclusions under all circumstances, thereby demonstrating a 
continuity of action under every condition. Interestingly, even the experts were 
not able to stabilize the critical variable "population size." however. 
Putz-Osterlon (1987; see also Putz-Osterloh & Lemmc, 1987) conducted a 
study in which she analyzed complex problem solving by experts (7 professors in 
economy, aged between 40 and 49) and novices (30 randomly selected students, 
aged between 19 and 27) who had to control the previously described business 
system TAILORSHOP for 15 months first and then the developmental scenario 
MORO for 20 months. Data analysis was concerned with the first six simulated 
months of each system, evaluating (a) the quality of interventions (analysis of 
subjects' behavior according to a complicated rating scale); (b) the frequency of 
use of domain-general strategies (according to a classification of verbal state-
ments during thinking aloud); and (c) system knowledge (also derived from 
thinking-aloud protocols). Results indicated that professors of economy were 
better with respect to all three kinds of criteria in the TA1LORSHOP situation. In 
the MORO situation, experts were better only with respect to strategies and 
knowledge, but not with respect to the quality of intervention. Putz-Ostcrloh 
concluded that experts differ from novices not because of different amounts of 
available data, but because of differences in processing these data: experts gener-
ate more correct hypotheses, more frequently and correctly analyze the relations 
between variables, and verbalize more often the expected effects of their planned 
interventions. 
Critical remarks concern the operationalization of expertise, which is marked-
ly confounded with age and therefore with life experience. Also, the dependent 
variables are primarily of a verbal nature, a kind of data that, in the opinion of 
this author, should not be the only source relied upon to characterize expert-
novices differences. 
SOLVING COMPLEX PROBLEMS A S KNOWLEDGE 
ACQUISITION A N D KNOWLEDGE APPLICATION 
In this section. I briefly describe my own work on complex problem solving. 
First. I describe the experimental setting, the scenario, that 1 used in various 
studies, and second. 1 summarize the theoretical framework underlying the 
studies. 
Description of Research Within the DYNAMIS-Project 
From (he beginning, research about solving complex problems had to cope with a 
number of diflicultics (sec the critical aspects mentioned by Funke. 1984). One 
centra/ difficulty was the measurement of problem-solving quality. Because there 
was no "best" intervention (due to the partially nonlinear relationships between 
the variables for which no optimal solution could be found), one could nevrr be 
quite sure if a subject's solution to a problem was really better or worse than any 
others. Therefore, problem-solving quality often was rated by "experts," 
The line of research done in our laboratory adheres to the following principles 
(Funke. 1986): 
1. It should always be possible to define the quality of a given problem 
solution by comparing it with an optimal solution strategy. 
2. The problem-solving situations should take into account the aforemen-
tioned features of complex problem solving insofar as possible. 
3. A differentiated diagnostic procedure should reveal the subject's develop-
ment of hypotheses about the system. This implies repeated measurements 
and/or the use of thinking-aloud techniques under certain conditions. 
4. There should be a clear distinction between a phase of knowledge acquisi-
tion (mainly realized by letting the subjects experiment with the system) and a 
phase of knowledge application, in which given states of the problem space 
should be reached by the subjects as quickly as possible. 
The DYNAMIS Shell for Scenarios 
Control of complex systems with dynamic behavior requires knowledge from the 
operator that has previously been acquired. To study the acquisition as well as the 
application of knowledge, we confront our subjects with computer-simulated 
scenarios. A universal tool for constructing these scenarios is the computer 
program DYNAMIS. It works like a shell, in that the user can implement in a 
simple way different types of simulation systems that follow one general frame of 
reference. This general frame of reference is a linear equation system (see. e.g.. 
Stcyer. 1984). which consists of an arbitrary number of exogenous ( = x) and 
endogenous (=y) variables according to the following equation: 
Y(t + 1) = A*Y(t) + B-X(t). 
where Y(t + I) and Ytt) are vectors representing the slate of the y-variables 
at times t + I and t. 
X(t>: a vector representing the values chosen by the subject for the x-
variables. 
A . B: weight matrices. 
The construction of the equation system follows theoretical considerations 
about the influence of certain system attributes on task complexity (e.g.. the 
effect of self-dynamic, side effects or effects due to inicrdcpendencics). It is not 
intended to simulate a domain of reality adequately because this kind of simula-
tion demands too many constraints on the attributes of the system. Consequently, 
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most of the simulation systems used in our research group are artificial ones. 
Regarding a distinction made by Hays and Singer < 1989). one can say we do not 
want physical fidelity of our simulation systems but do want functional fidelity 
(for a taxonomy of simulation fidelity considerations sec also Alcssi, 1988). 
Experimental Procedure 
In our experiments, subjects pass through at least two phases. In the first phase, 
the knowledge acquisition phase, the subject is allowed to explore the system and 
its behavior (see also Moray et al., 1986). Subjects can lake actions (i.e.. make 
an intervention on one or more of the exogenous variables) and observe the 
resulting effects on the endogenous variables. Rom lime to time, we measure the 
acquired knowledge by asking the subject for a graphical representation of his or 
her structural knowledge. In the second phase, called knowledge application, the 
subject has to reach a defined system state and try to keep the variables on the 
defined values. In this phase, we measure the quality of the operator's control by 
assessing the distance between the reached and the defined values for all endoge-
nous variables. Some remarks on measuring structural knowledge and system 
performance seem necessary at this point because of their central role in each 
study. Empirical studies based on this procedure have been done by Fritz and 
Rinke (1988. "ECOSYSTEM"). ftmke (1985, "ECOSYSTEM"), and by Fiinke 
and Muller(1988, "SINUS"). 
Measuring Structural Knowledge 
and System Performance 
Measuring knowledge and performance seems only on the first view to be an 
easy problem (for an overview, see Kluwe, 1988; Spada A Reimann. 1988). At a 
closer view, there are a lot of difficulties, some of which arc mentioned and 
possible solutions presented. A good review of problems in diagnosing "mental 
models" is given by Rouse and Morris (1986). 
Starting with system performance quality, the goal is to determine how well a 
given goal state is approximated by the operator's interventions. The classical 
approach requires the measurement of the deviation from the target system state 
by means of the root-mean-squares criterion (RMS). This indicator reflects the 
mean deviation, independent of sign, and weighs the individual deviations more 
heavily the further away they arc from the target state. A good discussion of the 
frequently used RMS criterion can be found in Bosser (1983). 
There is an aspect that reflects an ugly property of this kind of system perfor-
mance evaluation, however. Assume that an operator has knowledge about the 
system. Reaching the goal is of little or no difficulty for him and the resulting 
RMS will be low and near zero. But what about the operator with little or missing 
knowledge? The resulting distance to the goal state as measured by RMS varies 
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with his (random) interventions. According to certain system characteristics, this 
would result in a large variety of measured distances. Therefore, different values 
of the RMS do not. in this case, reflect different degrees of quality of system 
performance. The argument here is one of different reliabilities of the RMS 
criterion for different states of an operator's knowledge, which is best in the case 
of correct knowledge (RMS indicating reliable values near zero) and worst in the 
case of pure random intervention (RMS indicating a huge range of values due to 
decreasing reliability). 
One potential solution for this problem is a logarithmic transformation of the 
RMS- This transformation lead1' to an evaluation of distances which is more 
efficient: larger distances are now not weighed as more important but. rather, as 
less important. It does not matter if someone failed the goal by 10.000 or 
100.000 poims. as this is of the same importance as the difference between a 
deviation of 1 and 10. The transformation, thus, reduces the error variance that 
increases with the operator's distance to the goal state. 
Measuring the structural knowledge an operator has acquired about a system 
requires also some kind of distance or similarity measurement, in this case 
between the assumed and the real existing structural relations. R>r this purpose, 
the operator marks on a sheet (or. in some versions, direcUy on the screen) the 
assumed causal relationships at certain points in time. The problems with this 
kind of measurement arc: 
1. Subjects differ with respect to their response tendency. Therefore, one has 
to count not only the hiLs (i.e.. correspondence between assumed and existing 
relation), but also the false alarms. 
2- Subjects differ with respect to the quality of knowledge they can talk 
about: Sometimes any relationship between two variables is assumed (relational 
knowledge), sometimes the sign of the relation is known (sign knowledge), 
sometimes even the numerical weights are known (numerical knowledge). 
3. A false model can be useful for system control, at least within a restricted 
area of values. The functionality of a model is somewhat independent of its 
correctness. 
4. Subjects take certain assumptions as givens but do not talk about them. 
R>r example, if a variable does not change over the time, the weight for that 
relation is assumed to be equal to one. The subject often does not find worth 
mentioning this kind of knowledge. 
5. It is not clear if a subject follows only one single model or if there exist 
some models concurrently. 
Vot problems (3) to (5). no solution can be given at present- Problems (I) and 
(2). however, can be solved by using a quantification of the following kind: For 
each specification of a subject, one first counts whether it belongs to one of the 
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three classes of knowledge (relational, sign, numerical) and whether it is right or 
wrong with respect to the implemented system. Then, for each level one can 
determine the "quality of system identification" (QI> as the difference between 
"hits" (HI) and "false alarms" (FA), weighted by some kind of "guessing" 
probability (P) according to the following scheme, which closely resembles the 
discrimination index Pr from the two-high threshold model for recognition mem-
ory (see Snodgrass & Corwin. 1988: the proposed "correction for guessing" 
goes back to Wood worth. 1938): 
QI = (1 - p)»Hl/max(HI) - p*FA/max(FA), 
- P S QI £ (1 - P). 
The guessing probability for numerical parameters in a dynamic system 
could, for instance, be set equal to zero, so all hits count relative to the maximal 
number of hits. If one sets the guessing probability to 0.5 in the case of sign 
knowledge, then errors lead to a reduction in the QI index for that stage. 
Note that it is not required that the operator have a complete and correct model 
of the system in question, because good control is possible with models that are 
partly incorrect (but see Conant & Ashby. 1970). The reason for this stems from 
the functionality a false structure can have: With respect to a restricted range of 
values, different models can be functionally equivalent (to the degree of control 
they allow). This might be one reason for the fact that in everyday life we often 
use wrong models that are nevertheless functional (see. for example. Kcmpton. 
1986. who could show that up to 50% of Americans do not have a correct theory 
of home-heating control). 
Relation to Research on Scientific Reasoning 
Klahr and Dunbar (1988; see also Klahr. Dunbar. & Fay. in press) have recently 
developed an integrated model of scientific reasoning that seems to be applicable 
to our scenarios. At the core of their model is the Generalized Rule Inducer 
(GRI) (Simon & Lea, 1974). augmented by (a) a mechanism for the identifica-
tion of relevant attributes (because in scientific situations these attributes arc not 
given as in concept-learning tasks) and lb) a more complex "instance generator " 
Klahr and Dunbar argue "that scientific reasoning can be conceptualized as a 
search through two problem spaces: an hypothesis space and an experiment 
space" (1988, p. 7). These space* result from the task a scientist has. may he be a 
skilled one or a naive one: 
The successful scientist. like the successful explorer, must master two related 
skills: knowing where to look and understanding what is seen. The first skill-
experimental design—involves the design of experimental and observational pro-
cedures. The second skill—hypothesis formation—involves the formation and 
evaluation of theory, (p. 2) 
6. S O L V I N G C O M P L E X PROBLEMS 2 1 5 
Working with the toy "BigTrak"—a computer-controlled robot tank that can 
be programmed (see also Shrager & Klahr. 1986)—Klahr and Dunbar asked 
their subjects to explore the functions of the device, especially the function of the 
RPT-key. A fine analysis of verbal protocols of their subjects (Experiment I) 
showed that the hypothesis space was very small: Only eight different "com-
mon" hypotheses concerned with four attributes were found. A frame representa-
tion of the concept of the RPT key was important insofar as once a subject had 
constructed a particular frame, the task became one of filling in or verifying the 
contents of the slots in this frame. 
With respect to the experiment space. Klahr and Dunbar showed that there arc 
six different "regions" (combinations of values for two critical parameters) with 
different conclusions to be drawn. Incidentally, the experiment space is not the 
representation a subject has, but one that allows classifying subjects' experimen-
tal procedures. 
Data from their Experiment I demonstrated that there were at least two groups 
of subjects: so-called "Experimenters" and "Theorists." The difference between 
the two groups stems from the strategy according to which they shifted their 
frames: If subjects switched (heir frame as a consequence of a certain experimen-
tal outcome, they were called "Experimenters": if subjects searched in their 
hypothesis space and came to a shift, they were labeled as "Theorists." 
This theoretical framework seems applicable to the research topic of this 
chapter insofar as the experimental situation Klahr and Dunbar were concerned 
with—exploration of a hitherto unknown object—is basically identical to the 
situation of handling an unknown system. Furthermore. Klahr and Dunbar con-
ceptualize the process of knowledge acquisition in terms of hypotheses that arc 
more or less deductively or inductively developed. 
Aside from the similarities in the experimental procedures and in the the-
oretical frames of reference, however, there are some differences. The main 
difference can be seen in the way subjects' knowledge is measured. Klahr and 
Dunbar use primarily verbal data (see Bainbridge, 1979, for a comment on 
verbal data in this context), whereas in our procedure different approaches are 
taken to diagnose the structural knowledge a subject acquires. This difference is 
partly due to our "object" of exploration: subjects explicitly have to anticipate 
the next states of the system, they have to write down their hypotheses about 
structural relationships, and they have to control the system a* well as possible. 
PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Three tasks for future research are outlined briefly: (a) a differentiation between 
factors influencing complex problem solving resulting from the individual as 
well as from the situational and die system attributes; (b) reliability and validity 
research on complex problem-solving scenarios; and (c) adequate measurement 
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of the actual "mental model" and of the potential heuristics that complex prob-
lem solvers use. also over time. 
Concerning the first task, separation of person, situation, and system influ-
ences on performance measures, the approach taken by Sircufert et al. (1988) 
seems to point in the right direction: instead of using "free" simulations in which 
decisions can change a system's state quite drastically, ihcy use a "quasi-experi-
mental simulation technology." in which the system reacts in part independently 
from subjects* interventions such that each subject receives comparable in forma -
lions and events. Despite this fact, subjects still believe that they have direct or 
delayed impact on the system. This technique should be extended further in order 
to standardize the conditions under which subjects' performance quality is mea-
sured independent from system attribute*. 
Concerning Task 2. reliability and validity aspects, there is a lot of work to 
do: up to now. mainly face validity exists. Jiiger (1986) speaks of "uncovered 
checks" that have to be cashed in subsequent research (p. 274). It is simply not 
enough to show that there are no correlations to standard intelligence tests, 
because many reasons can account for that result. Rather, one has to show 
positive coiwcesions to other psychometric instruments, as well as to external 
criteria. One possible line of research could be the use of the learning test 
concept (e.g.. Guthkc. 1982). according to which intelligence is not a static 
variable but, rather, is to be interpreted as "learning potential." It seems plausi-
ble thai there exists a relation between learning potential and the ability to solve 
complex problems. 
With respect to reliability, work also has to be done. One promising way of 
evaluating reliability of complex problem-solving indicators was recently pro-
posed by Muller (1989). Following the concepts of consistency and stability 
developed by Sieyer (1987). Muller applied this design to studies of complex 
problem solving. His procedure is as follows: at two times of measurement (TM, 
and TM2). two parallel forms of a system (PF, and PF2> are given to the same 
subjects, yielding the four observed variables y , , . y2l, y ,2 . and y22 (first index for 
the system parallel form, second index for time of measurement; see Fig. 6.1 >. 
In this design (and when certain assumptions about uncorrected residuals, 
etc.. are met), it is possible, based on covarianccs. to determine the degree of 
measurement accuracy (=consistency) as well as the stability of the measured 
construct (the problem-solving "competence"). 
Concerning Task 3. the adequate measurement of the operator's mental model 
and his heuristics, one has to develop instruments that sensitively assess those 
relevant parts of human memory that are required for exploration and control. 
Whereas in the area of assessing structural (or declarative) knowledge some 
useful techniques exist, there are clear deficits in diagnosing the heuristic knowl-
edge on which human problem solvers operate. Also, more attention should be 
given to developing measurement techniques that reveal the implicit knowledge 
of an operator. 
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FIG. 6.1. Design of a s tudy tor assess ing consistency and stability 
data (from Muller, 1989). 
Concerning the general research strategy, it seems more useful to manipulate 
critical variables in systems that already exist than to create new systems. Only 
the strategy of analyzing the effects of small variation*—the experimental meth-
od—can offer new insights into the principles and mechanisms that govern 
complex human problem solving. 
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Do Lawyers Reason Differently 7 From Psychologists? A Comparative Design for Studying Expertise 
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Legal reasoning has a logic of its own. 
—E. H. Levi (1949) 
Lawyers arc experts in solving complex problems in their domain of expertise. 
For example, how a case ought 10 be presented, a contract drawn up. and when 
and when not (o go to court are types of problems best left to lawyers who arc 
trained to deal with them. Generally speaking, people appreciate the value of 
legal expertise. Very few people hire a psychologist to solve their legal problems 
or a lawyer to solve their psychological problems, although, as any good episode 
of "L.A. Law" suggests, people sometimes confuse their psychological prob-
lems with their legal ones. Such confusions of problem-states notwithstanding, 
people see both lawyers and psychologists as equipped to solve different prob-
lems by virtue of their training and experience. 
This basic insight is not challenged, or even addressed, in this chapter. We 
address a different question: Docs the training and experience of lawyers equip 
them to solve the same problem differently than experts in other professions? 
This may not be the theoretical focus that the reader expected. However, we 
believe that this question better addresses the central issue of this book: How arc 
complex problems solved, and what are the underlying principles and mecha-
nisms of such problem-solving skills? By examining whether lawyers and other 
groups of novices and experts solve the same problems differently, we can begin 
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